W h a t E c o l o g i s t s S h o u l d D o w i t h S t a t i s t i c s , a n d W h a t W e 'd L ik e T o D o w i t h T h e m
E cology is the scien ce which says what everyone know s in language that no one understands.-Elton
1927
As ecologists, we study relationships between or ganism s and their physical and biological environments (e.g., Pianka 1994), and we describe these relationships using the language o f statistics. A nyone who has taught introductory ecology probably would attest that this language can distort and refract Elton's " quantitative natural history" in strange and unpredictable ways. In general, w e can identify two fundamental goals o f an ecological experiment, whether descriptive or manip ulative: pa ra m eter estim ation and hypothesis testing.
In this and the follow ing section, I discuss frequentist and Bayesian approaches to these goals. 
T a b u ; 1. Some fundamental differences between frequentist and Bayesian statistical inference in their uses and interpretations of statistical concepts and terms. (Table 1 ) . We cannot use Eq. 1 to state that there is a k% probability that the true mean does in fact occur within the confidence interval w e created from our e x periment, and Eq. 1 is not a probability distribution in w hich we expect p to occur (H ow son and Urbach 1991). Since p is fixed, it is either inside a confidence interval or outside it. It makes no sense to assert that a fixed parameter w ou ld occur in a fixed confidence interval only k% o f the time (Sokal and R ohlf 1995).
In addition, for most parameterized, nonnormal distri butions, the actual probability that Eq. 1 includes p is substantially (£ 6 0 % ) less than the expected coverage k (e.g., Robinson 1975). . Top: illustration of the relationship between the two hypothetical prior probability distributions described by Eqs. 6 and 7, and the likelihood function based on the hy pothetical experimental data. Bottom: Posterior probability distributions resulting from applying Bayes' theorem to the top panel.
estimates (Fig. 1). Since Bayesian inference is an it
erative process, the posterior probability distribution ( 1961) and Kass and Raftery (1995) . In this table, the value given is based on / Í t h e evidence a gainst H 0. where the likelihood of H0 would be the denominator and the likelihood of //, would be the numerator in Eq. 11. This reciprocal of the likelihoods given in Eq. 11 is how most ecologists would be likely to use Bayes factors in day-to-day research.
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